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ABSTRACT

Analyses of neoliberal labor market restructuring debate whether neoliberalism is homogenizing jobs
or polarizing them. Analyses of informal employment debate whether such employment is inferior,
and if so, if it is typically a transition or a trap. This paper speaks to both debates, using a three
time-point (2006, 2007, 2008) longitudinal survey of retail workers in the state of Tlaxcala, Mexico,
to contrast workers’ experiences across the spectrum of formal and informal work. Using the
longitudinal data, the paper compares workers’ trajectories, exploring how they make choices and
navigate transitions between more formal and more informal work. A qualitative portion of the
survey permits the comparison of people’s aspirations and insight into how those aspirations shift
overtime.
Differences within formal and informal retail sectors loom as large as differences between the two
sectors. For example, while formal retail workers earned more and in most cases have greater
earnings growth than informal ones, much of the earnings advantage disappears when we excluded
formal retail supervisors and managers and focus on rank-and-file workers. Class and gender, in
addition to market position, structure differential access to better outcomes. Transitions between
formal and informal work are rare in this sample, and progress toward aspirations are very limited for
most subgroups. The expansion of retail chains appears to be degrading job quality among informal
retail workers (through heightened competition), but without leading to better jobs for the typical
employee in the chains. In addition, large numbers of job-seekers without viable alternatives are
entering informal retail, once more degrading job quality through added competition.
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Introduction and Literature
The country-level impact of neoliberal restructuring on labor markets is hotly debated. One
central debate concerns the extent and pattern of homogenization or polarization in job quality
taking place within national workforces (Carré et al., 2012). Whereas some argue that a process of
work degradation is homogenizing jobs at a low level (Harrison and Bluestone, 1988: 195;
Gonçalves and Madi, 2011: 107, 109), others have pointed to heightened polarization as the main
result, and have explored the ways that worker characteristics lead to sorting across divergent
outcomes (Kalleberg, 2012). More sophisticated investigations of these questions examine not just
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the evolution of cross-sections of earnings or other measures of job quality, but also the trajectories
of individuals over their careers, since poor quality jobs are of greatest concern if people are stuck in
jobs of that quality level (Andersson, Holzer, and Lane, 2005).
Though this debate, dominated by voices from the North, has focused empirically on formal
employment, the larger concerns motivating it apply equally to informal work, especially given
evidence for the expansion of informality, and informalization of nominally formal employment, in
both the North (e.g. Bernhardt et al., 2008) and the South (e.g. Tilly et al., 2013). It thus connects
to continuing controversies regarding informal employment. Theoretically, perhaps the longeststanding discussion in the literature on informality considers whether informal work is dualist (a
holdover of archaic forms of work organization originating outside the modern economy), legalist
(entrepreneurship seeking alternative channels due to overly restrictive regulations), or survivalist
(the last resort of those with no viable economic alternative) (Avirgan, Bivens, and Gammage,
2005). Empirically, then, there has been much attention to the relative quality of formal and
informal jobs and to mobility between one status and the other. This literature has particularly
flourished in Latin America, and we review it selectively below.
We speak to these debates with a study of formal and informal retail jobs in Mexico. In
particular, we address three questions. First, to what degree is there divergence or convergence
between formal and informal retail workers, and within each of these retail subsectors? Second, what
are the roles of market position, gender, and class in structuring retail workers’ outcomes and
trajectories? Finally, how has Mexico’s neoliberal economic restructuring, and in particular the
remaking of the retail sector itself, affected the quality of jobs and the nature of Mexicans’ labor
market strategies?
Retail employment presents an ideal setting for exploring these issues, since retail jobs in Latin
America straddle formal and informal employment, extending from global chains to self-employed
street vendors. Mexico is of particular interest because it represents a classic case of neoliberal
restructuring, because formal and informal employment are large and diverse, and because the
quality of formal and informal work have been extensively studied, giving us a baseline of empirical
literature (de la Garza, 2012a). In this paper, we draw on a three time-point (2006, 2007, 2008)
longitudinal survey of retail workers in the state of Tlaxcala, Mexico. Using longitudinal data, we
can compare trajectories, not just point-in-time outcomes, of workers. We track earnings and
degree of security and mobility. We also track people’s preferences via questions about aspirations.
Importantly, longitudinal data enable us to compare people’s experiences with their aspirations, and
follow how those aspirations themselves shift. We pay particular attention to differences by market
position, class, and gender.
Informal work is subject to varied and evolving definitions. We define informal work as work
that creates legal goods or services, but does not offer the standard terms and benefits specified for
jobs under law – either because the law does not cover these particular jobs, or because the law is
not effectively enforced. This definition, which has the advantages of conceptual clarity and broad
applicability, follows Castells and Portes (1989), and has since been widely adopted (e.g.
Hussmanns, 2004). To implement the definition, we adopt an elaboration proposed by Cobb, King
and Rodriguez (2009), who replace the unrealistically rigid ideal-type dichotomy between formal
and informal work with a more flexible spectrum of formality. They consider four aspects of formality
(consistency of wage reporting, adherence to labor laws, employment steadiness, and legality of
working status), noting that various combinations can be observed. Temkin (2008), studying
Mexico, similarly defines three levels of informality, having one, two, or all three of the
characteristics of working without a formal contract, lacking social security, or working in
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establishments that do not issue official receipts. We apply a similar framework to a range of retail
workers across a spectrum of formality.
Informal employment is typically viewed as inferior employment (e.g. Fields, 2004). Most
Mexican researchers have reported results corresponding to this view (Levy, 2008; Negrete, 2012).
Informal workers themselves seem to agree: Temkin (2009), analyzing an opinion survey of Mexican
workers, finds informal employees report feeling less satisfied and in control of their work and lives
than formal employees, but that the informal self-employed are the most unhappy of all. However, a
growing literature posits that informal work is often superior. De Soto (1989) champions the legalist
position, arguing that much informal business activity is simply entrepreneurship driven
underground by excessive regulation. Moreover, according to some data, higher income individuals,
especially business owners, are more likely to conceal economic activity (Waldinger and Lapp,
1993). But even at the lower end of the labor market, informal employment may offer higher wages,
greater schedule flexibility, or other advantages that make it preferable (Maloney, 2004).
Particularly notable in tackling these questions is a set of studies of longitudinal data in
Mexico (Bargain and Kwenda, 2011; Maloney, 2003; Gong, van Soest, and Villagomez, 2004),
Brazil (Bargain and Kwenda, 2011; Ulyssea and Szerman, 2006), Chile (Joubert, 2011), and Central
America (Funkhouser, 1997) that track transitions between formal and informal employment and
examine the supply- and demand-side determinants of ending up in one or the other sector. While
shedding new light on labor market trajectories, it has generated continuing debate about the
relative quality of formal and informal employment. Maloney (1999) and Bosch and Maloney
(2007) report that informal workers do better, whereas Bargain and Kwenda (2009-2011)
distinguish between salaried work, in which formal workers fare better, and self-employment, in
which, at least in Brazil, informal proprietors earn more.
This longitudinal literature also generates estimates of the frequency of transitions between
formal and informal employment. For example, Gong et al. (2004) estimate that as many as 20
percent of Mexican men and 10 percent of women who started out in the informal sector had
moved to the formal sector as of one year later. These levels of mobility suggest that for many,
informality may not be a trap, but just one stop in a longer trajectory. Interestingly, while Gong and
co-authors find mobility in and out of informal jobs more rapid than for formal ones, Ulyssea and
Szerman conclude that, at least in Brazil, there is an ‘informality trap’ that sharply reduces exit from
informality after the first several months.
Despite these important recent exceptions, most literature on informal employment is crosssectional in nature, remaining silent on the question of mobility over time. Moreover, the
longitudinal analyses cited above are strictly quantitative, omitting variables that capture individuals’
perspectives, aspirations, or strategies. Our strategy in this research was to conduct in-person
interviews in order to learn about these more qualitative aspects of the work experience and
specifically to assess workers’ degree of goal attainment. Our Mexican sample was small and nonrepresentative, but stratified to include various sectors of retail.
As noted briefly above, Mexico, and its retail sector in particular, are of interest for a number
of reasons. Mexico has experienced thorough-going neoliberalization since the 1980s, with
concomitant expansion of degraded, precarious, and informal employment (de la Garza, 2012a).
Shifts in sectoral mix and increasing employer avoidance of labor regulations have expanded
informality from the labor demand side, whereas anemic overall job creation has expanded the
supply of desperate workers for whom informal work is the best available option. In 2010, an
estimated 61 percent of Mexico’s employed worked informally, in the sense of working in nonregistered businesses or in formal businesses but without enjoying basic worker rights (de la Garza,
2012b). Retail is of interest because, as pointed out above, it includes extensive formal and informal
43

labor components, with giant, modern retailers such as Walmart dominating the formal portion,
while street vendors anchor the informal end (Tilly, 2006). The rapid expansion of both big-box and
convenience store chains is very new in Mexico, as in Latin America as a whole. Indeed, the growing
global dominance of giant retailers is often identified as a central feature of neoliberal globalization
(Lichtenstein, 2009). In the Mexican context, retail is also the largest single employment sector:
about one Mexican worker in five works in retail (Tilly and Álvarez, 2006). Among informal
workers, more than one in three works in informal retail (de la Garza, 2012). Despite this, the retail
workforce as a whole remains understudied. There are notable studies of street vendors (e.g. Cross,
1998; Olivo, 2012), but only a few of workers in formal retailers, most of which focus on Walmart
(e.g. Carré and Tilly, 2013; ProDESC, 2009). The workforce turnover rate in formal retail is
estimated at 120 percent by the Asociación Nacional de Tiendas de Autoservicio y Departamentales
(ANTAD), the Mexican retailers’ association, suggesting that longitudinal study is particularly
appropriate in order to be able to follow workers who pass through retail employment.
The findings point to complexity rather than simple dichotomies. We find that on average,
formal retail workers earn more and in most cases have greater earnings growth than informal ones.
However, much of the earnings advantage disappears when we exclude formal retail supervisors and
managers and focus on rank-and-file workers. We also find large income disparities among informal
retailers, both by format and within formats. Only a minority of workers in any of the categories
transitioned out of their initial jobs, and cases of mobility to a different retail sector or out of retail
altogether are rare indeed – particularly for workers starting out in informal jobs. As regards goal
attainment, workers in our sample had relatively modest aspirations – above all, to open or expand
one’s own business. Most made some progress toward those aspirations over the two-year study
period, but typically the progress was extremely limited, and quite a few workers slipped backwards.
Confronted with these harsh realities, many lowered their expectations over time.
In short, we encounter both divergences within retail sub-sectors, but convergence between
non-managerial formal retail workers and informal retail workers – a combination of polarization
and homogenization.1 Class and gender, in addition to market position, structure differential access
to better outcomes. The expansion of retail chains appears to be degrading job quality among
informal retail workers (through heightened competition), but without leading to better jobs for the
typical employee in the chains. In addition, large numbers of job-seekers without viable
alternatives – arguably a product of Mexican neoliberal policies undermining small-scale agriculture
and import substitution manufacturing – are entering informal retail, once more degrading job
quality through added competition.

Methods and Data
We gathered a convenience sample of 91 workers in food retailing in the state of Tlaxcala,
Mexico in spring 2006. Tlaxcala is Mexico’s smallest state, located about 100 kilometers east of
Mexico City in central Mexico. We sampled workers by walking and driving through the
commercial areas of the major cities of Tlaxcala, entering retail establishments, and inviting workers
to participate in the study. Workers were concentrated in the capital city of Tlaxcala and its twin
city, the commercial center of Santa Ana Chiautempan. However, we also included workers in
several smaller cities. Although we report numbers and percentages, it is important to keep in mind
that due to the convenience nature of the sample, the statistics are only descriptive of the sample
itself, and cannot be used for inference about a larger population.
We intentionally sampled from six sub-sectors covering every channel of food retail in Mexico.
Table 1 details the sample. From most formal to least formal, the sub-sectors are chain stores,
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supplier services, mom and pops and public market stands (both with about the same degree of
formality), tianguis (weekly street market) stands, and independent street vendors. This order is
based on our assessment of their degree of compliance with legal regulations, and in particular
accurate reporting to government authorities.
The initial (2006) interview gathered information on work history, the retail job, earnings
from that and other jobs, household structure, household income sources, and aspirations for one
year and five years in the future. In the two subsequent waves, we re-asked all of these questions and
asked about progress toward aspirations stated earlier. In these later interviews, we asked about the
current job, regardless of whether it was in retail. However, as we shall see, very few respondents left
the retail industry.
Based on these interviews, we operationalize class as education (the lines between incomplete
secondary education, complete secondary education, and higher education are particularly critical)
and social capital (contacts, access to assistance from family, and so on). We operationalize market
position via a set of empirically observed competitive advantages, especially what we call locational
advantage, meaning location that is central, easily accessible, and/or part of a concentrated retail
agglomeration.
Table 1: The Sample and Its Sub-Sectors

Sub-sector

Description

Degree of
formality

Chain
stores

National and regional chains of multiple stores

Highly
formal

Supplier
services

Includes commission wholesale salespeople
and promotores marketing products to
consumers in the store

Mom and
pop stores
(abarrotes)

# in 2006
sample

# with
follow-up
interview(s)

38 (including
21 supervisors
& managers)

24

Relatively
formal

8

5

Small, individually owned stores in fixed, fully
enclosed locations

Moderately
formal

18

11

Public
market

Stands in open areas of enclosed public
markets

Moderately
formal

7

6

Tianguis
(weekly
markets)

Stands that set up in weekly markets that locate Relatively
in a different place each day of the week
informal

8

8

Independent Selling out of house or on the street, not in fixed Highly
informal
street
location markets or tianguis. Includes some
vendors
purely self-employed and some selling branded
goods such as popsicles.

12

10

TOTAL

91

65

In the initial interview, we gathered varied contact information in order to be able to recontact workers in future years. We were able to re-contact 65 (71 percent) of the original 91
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respondents in spring 2007, spring 2008, or both. We reached all but 6 of those 65 in 2008.
Interviews were recorded and transcribed.
To obtain quantitative totals across all retail sectors, we weighted the means or proportions
from each sector by weights based on employment estimates from the 2009 Economic Census for
stores, suppliers, and public market stands, and based on the 2012 Encuesta Nacional de Ocupación
y Empleo (ENOE) for tianguis mobile market stands and ambulant street vendors (we thank
Enrique de la Garza Toledo for ENOE tabulations; contact authors for details of weight
estimation).
Because the narrative refers to chains by name, Appendix Table A offers capsule descriptions
of the chains in the sample.
Beginning in 2007 and continuing into 2008, the US economy sank slowly into recession (the
financial crisis exploded later in 2008, after these surveys), and the Mexican economy
correspondingly slowed down as well. Indicators of labor market distress show that Tlaxcala’s labor
force was hit moderately hard by this deepening downturn (see Appendix Table B).

Findings
We present findings in three areas: earnings and earnings growth, security and mobility
(starting with a summary of workers’ aspirations), and the degree to which aspirations are realized.
These variables have the advantages of measurability, broad comparability across jobs and over time,
and relative objectivity.
Earnings levels and changes
In examining earnings, we seek to discern the degree of convergence or divergence between
formal and informal retail work, and how recent economic restructuring has affected earnings. Retail
work, in general, pays much better than minimum wage. However, at around $6.50 per day (in
purchasing power U.S. dollars), workers who depend exclusively on this daily minimum wage live in
extreme poverty. In this study, 10 percent of workers earned at or below the minimum wage during
at least one year. Mexican pesos have been converted to U.S. dollars using the Purchasing Power
Parities provided by the OECD.
As shown in Table 2, retail workers and worker-owners in our sample earned an average of
596 dollars per month ($25 daily) from 2006 to 2008. In the aggregate, more workers in more
formal businesses – chain stores and supplier services – earned substantially more than those in more
informal formats. Chain store workers averaged $34 a day and $823 a month, with supplier service
workers earning even more. In contrast, workers in the less formal formats were clustered around
$15-20/day and $350-500/month. Each of these averages conceals a wide set of divergences: the
ratio of lowest to highest monthly pay rates ranged from about 3:1 for supplier services to nearly 9:1
for the tianguis market.
Once we separate chain supervisors and managers from everyday employees, new divergences
and convergences emerge: we find divergence within chain employees, and convergence between lowend chain employees and informal retail workers. Whereas managerial employees have earnings
similar to those in supplier services (the highest earner, the owner-manager of an Oxxo convenience
store, earned $2000 a month), non-managerial chain store workers have lower earnings than workers
in any of the less formal formats (with the lowest earner, stocking electronics at a Gigante
superstore, earning only $139/month). The expansion of corporate retail has actually created worse
jobs for workers at the bottom of the pyramid.
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Table 2: Annual Monthly & Daily Income (in USD) by Sub-Sector (averages across the three waves)
Monthly

Daily

Chains

$823

$34.31

- Chains-Supervisorial

1,186

49.41

383

15.95

1,261

52.54

Mom and Pop stores

407

16.94

Public Market

510

21.26

Tianguis

391

19.53

Independent street vendors

410

17.06

TOTAL AVERAGE

565

23.94

- Chains-Non-supervisorial
Supplier Services

Note: All numbers in Purchasing Power Parity US Dollars (USD)

Supplier services show stratification of earnings by job category as well. The wholesale
salespeople (all men) earned considerably more than the store-based promotoras (all women)
promoting products to customers. Serena [all names are pseudonyms], who promoted dairy
products, and described her responsibilities as ‘waiting on customers, receiving product and
checking expiration dates’ earned the least of the supplier services workers, with an average monthly
salary of $433 in 2006.
The earnings gaps between various worker categories are shaped particularly by market
position. The higher average level of daily earnings of supervisors, managers, and sales personnel in
more formal retail channels is tied to both market position (relative to informal groups) and class
(relative to frontline workers). Unsurprisingly, formal businesses (chains and supplier services) with
prime locations, larger formats (offering convenient, quick one-stop shopping), and investments in
equipment and systems, were able to sell larger volumes and provide higher pay to their upper level
workers. Supervisory and management positions, middle class jobs which typically require at least
some college, pay more than line worker positions in the chain stores.
Different market positions, and in particular locational advantages, also distinguish the various
less formal channels. The public market – well-known, centrally located, offering a wide variety of
merchandise and open every day (thus offering convenience relative to other informal formats) –
provided the highest incomes after retail chains, and within the public market, owners of larger or
multiple stalls earned more than those with smaller, single stalls. Mom and pop stores enjoy the
advantages of week-long operation in a fixed site, but are less centrally located, offer limited goods,
and typically just serve customers from a single neighborhood.
In contrast with the public market and corner stores, tianguis weekly street markets circulate
to different locations each day of the week, limiting their ability to make capital investments or
build up a faithful clientele. Vendors in our sample typically specialized in one type of product (for
example fruits, vegetables, cheese or seeds) and had a very small assortment. Because of the licensing
system and the time needed to travel from one market to another, vendors at the rotating street
markets typically have only four days to sell, whereas other businesses are open at least six days a
week (and are also open longer hours). Importantly, unlike the indoor public market, with a fixed
number of stalls, tianguis are located outdoors under temporary awnings, and the number of vendors
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can easily be increased. Thus, tianguis stands have more limited access to consumer demand and are
more vulnerable to competing supply.
Independent vendors have the smallest scale, the least capital, and are the least protected from
entry by other competing sellers. Their situations varied, with most preparing their own
merchandise (sweets or potato chips, for example) and selling them on the street or in a corner of
the market without a formal stand. One self-employed vendor sold fruit and vegetables from a stand
in front of her house, another circulated a sweets cart around the public market, and another sold
popsicles supplied by the BonIce brand. These businesses were typically constrained by their size;
control of only a very small space and lack of storage capacity limited the quantity and assortment of
merchandise to what they could expect to sell in a given day. Even so, their earnings were
comparable to (and slightly above) their mom and pop counterparts.
Though earnings of formal retail workers benefit from their business’s competitive advantages
of central locations and economies of scale, informal workers have access to other strategies to
increase total household income. Perhaps most importantly, less formal family businesses typically
deploy unpaid family workers. Most owner-workers in the sample hired family members or
otherwise depended on their free labor. In calculating monthly and weekly earnings in family
businesses, we divided by the number of adults working, to avoid inflating earnings estimates. Given
this adjustment, adult unpaid family workers add nothing to the per-adult earnings we report, but in
terms of household survival strategy they add to total family income without any added out-ofpocket cost.
Another strategy to increase total income is holding multiple jobs. Particularly common is the
case of people who hold a formal job, but add a flexible, informal job to supplement their income.
For instance, Carlos worked as a university professor, but his flexible work schedule also permitted
him to operate first one, then multiple corner stores.
Real earnings among Tlaxcala retail workers rose by 13 percent between 2006 and 2007, but
only by 2% between 2007 and 2008 as the slowdown in the US economy rippled through Mexico.
The changes in earnings are summarized in Table 3. The net growth was concentrated in the more
formal sectors: chains, vendor services and public markets. In chains, non-managerial workers gained
more than managers in the upturn, but lost more in the downturn. Surprisingly, public markets were
the only sector where earnings continued to grow even during the economic downturn that began to
affect retail in 2007. This sector’s 68 percent increase in income over three years was the highest of
any sector, followed by supplier services at 59 percent and chains at 20 percent. The rest of the less
formal sectors all saw negative growth rates. Losses in the tianguis rotating street market sector were
most dramatic: 100 percent of vendors saw an income decline.
Worker-owners blamed competition that cut into already low profits, and their analysis
points out to the continuing effects of neoliberal restructuring. The biggest culprits they pointed to
are the chains, particularly the gigantic autoservicios offering variety and convenience. Melisa, a public
market worker, reported that with the opening of Aurrera in 2003, her sales dropped immediately
by as much as $6.50 per day – the equivalent of her daily income in 2007.
Some street market vendors reported an increase in hours in order to try to recoup this loss of
income. Despite increasing their hours, the rising price of inputs and low rates of consumption
prevented a corresponding rise of income. David, who sold fruit and DVDs at the street markets,
went from four days a week in 2006 to seven days in 2008, but his income dropped from $612 to
$348 over the same years – a total decline of 43%. This pattern was noted by people in all of the
less formal retail sectors. Employees in small and informal businesses reported working increased
hours for less pay, and worker-owners reported earning less despite long hours.
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Table 3: Percent Change in Earnings by Sector
% change
2006-2007

% change
2007-2008

% change
2006-2008

Chains

21%

-1%

20%

- Chains-Supervisorial

13%

-1%

12%

- Chains-Non-supervisorial

34%

-9%

22%

Supplier Services

35%

18%

59%

Mom and Pop stores

-1%

-13%

-15%

Public Market

49%

12%

68%

Tianguis

17%

-47%

-37%

Independent street vendors

-7%

1%

-6%

ALL Retail Workers

13%

2%

15%

Note: Includes only workers who stayed in the same retail sector.
As documented below, this is the overwhelming majority of workers.

Yet large chains are not the only source of competition. As the economy worsens and the
supply of job-seekers expands, informal retail is one of the most common industries that workers
turn to. Very small-scale informal workers who have no overhead costs sometimes create another
important source of competition that small-business owners face. Public market vendor Melisa
attributed her dramatic drop in income not only to Aurrera, but also to the emergence of more
informal vendors. She described a new local government policy to expand the vending zone around
the public market in order to offer more economic opportunities for the unemployed. As she
pointed outside to a whole new section of the market where people sold the same goods as her and
the other workers-owners around her, she said: ‘I think there are too many of us. So much
competition now…Every year we sell less and less.’
In brief, two outcomes of neoliberal restructuring – expanded corporate competition and a
flood of unemployed and underemployed workers – undermined retail workers’ earnings, especially
in informal retail. Based on our evidence, we cannot definitively answer why public market earnings
bucked this trend. However, a possible explanation is that in economic hard times, former patrons
of chain retailers ‘traded down’ to the cheaper but still relatively convenient public markets – much
as consumers in the United States switched from Walmart to the even lower-priced dollar stores
during the recession.
Mobility and security
A starting point for evaluating mobility and security is to consider what the workers
themselves hoped to achieve. Worker aspirations, for each sub-sector and for the total, are shown in
Table 4. Every worker expressed at least one aspiration, and the great majority expressed more than
one. We classify the goals as advancing within informal employment, advancing within formal
employment, more general financial goals, and the ‘exit’ option of migration abroad to seek work.
By far the most frequent goal expressed by the food retail workers interviewed was to open
their own business. Over half of all workers hoped to open a business within the next one to five
years. The most common kind of business that people imagined opening was a small grocery store in
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front of their homes (typically informal). In addition, most of those who already owned a business
hoped to expand or improve their business.
Workers’ reasons for wishing to open a business reflect the disadvantages of corporate
employment in Mexico’s neoliberal regime – and thus the continuing appeal of informality. First,
many, even those formally employed at large chains, who might expect to receive a pension, saw
opening their own business as a sort of social security, recognizing the precariousness and insecurity
of corporate employment over the longer run.
Second, many expressed a preference for self-employment due to autonomy, control over
one’s social time, and social status. Francisco, who rated his sales job in supplier services a 10 on the
scale of 1 to 10, and considered it very well-paying, still said he planned on quitting as soon as he
had enough money to invest in a small grocery store: ‘Working for someone else is good, but having
your own business is better.’
On the formal side, getting promoted to a higher level position was an objective of most retail
workers in chains and vendor services. Two-thirds of chain store employees hoped to move up.
However, this breaks down to almost every supervisor and manager, and less than half of the line
employees. It is interesting to note that moving up the career ladder was an aspiration most often
named in conjunction with, rather than exclusive of, opening one’s own business. Three-quarters of
those who aimed to move up also hoped to open their own business.
Table 4: Distribution of Aspirations by Sub-Sector (Percentage expressing each aspiration)
Informal
Advancement

Formal Advancement

Financial Advancement
Invest in
House,
Spend
Car,
Save
on
Furniture Money
Family

Exit

Open
Business

Improve
Business

Find
Another
Job

Move up

Study

Chains

63%

4%

29%

67%

21%

13%

8%

8%

42%

Chains:
Supervisorial

75%

0%

25%

92%

8%

8%

0%

8%

58%

Chains: Nonsupervisorial

50%

8%

33%

42%

33%

17%

17%

8%

33%

Supplier
Service

100%

0%

40%

60%

0%

0%

0%

20%

20%

Mom & Pops

36%

36%

45%

0%

18%

18%

9%

18%

55%

Public Market

33%

67%

33%

0%

17%

50%

0%

0%

33%

Tianguis

38%

63%

25%

0%

13%

63%

13%

0%

63%

Independent
Street Vendor

64%

55%

18%

0%

18%

18%

0%

0%

9%

TOTAL

55%

31%

31%

29%

17%

23%

6%

8%

40%

Migrate

Studying – including high school, college, English or computer classes, or further job
training – was one of the least likely aspirations to be named (in part because of the wide range of
ages represented in the sample). About one in six retail workers expressed a desire to study more.
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About one-fifth of workers simply expressed goals of purchasing durable goods such as a house
or car, saving money, or undertaking the expenses to start a family or help family members advance.
Finally, forty percent of workers had thought about exiting the Mexican labor market
altogether and migrating to the United States – joining a stream that has expanded massively in the
neoliberal era. Interestingly, high percentages of workers not only in informal sectors, but also
among college-educated retail managers, contemplated this possibility.
We find that workers’ ability to translate these varied aspirations into reality was limited by
inequalities within the expanding corporate retail sector, as well as heightened competition driven
by the expansion of large chains simultaneous with the flood of people without other options into
informal retail work.
Workers did strive to better their positions. Most importantly, many workers attempted to
improve or at least preserve their earnings by changing jobs, including some changes from formal to
informal employment and vice versa. However, as Table 5 shows, the majority – 57 percent – of
retail workers remained in their original jobs over the two year span of this study. Most who
changed jobs did so within the same company. We saw very few cases of workers departing retail
altogether. A few left the work force outright: all were women who did so because of family
obligations, and all were from the mom and pop sector.
Table 5: Transition Matrix of Retail Workers, 2006-08

Destination
Origin
Chains

Remain
in same
retail job

Moved
up
in same
company

Same
sector but
different
employer

Moved to
a different
retail Sector

Moved
outside of
retail

Nonemployment

38%

33%

17%

8%

4%

0%

25%

0%

0%

0%

Chains
- Supervisorial

50%

25%

Chains
-Non-supervisorial

25%

42%

8%

17%

8%

0%

Supplier Services

60%

20%

20%

0%

0%

0%

Mom and Pop stores

45%

0%

9%

0%

27%

18%

Public Market

83%

17%

0%

0%

0%

0%

Tianguis

100%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

Independent street
vendors

64%

9%

9%

18%

0%

0%

ALL Retail Workers

57%

17%

9%

8%

6%

3%

In general, less formal retail channels had more stable employees. Four out of five public
market worker-owners, and all of the tianguis workers, were in the same job two years later. Given
the distinct fortunes of public market and tianguis workers, we surmise that the former case
represents security in a decent job, whereas the latter represents a lack of options – adding to the
evidence for divergence within informal retail.
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At the other extreme, only one-quarter of non-supervisorial chain store employees occupied
the same job two years later. Among less formal formats, mom and pop stores had exceptionally high
mobility, but this was entirely due to the women who left to care for children. Many mom and pops
are supplemental income projects for middle class families, making this kind of exit economically
feasible.
Table 6: Job Transitions and Income Changes
% with Any Job
Change

% with Change that Resulted in Higher
Income

Chain

63%

80%

Chains: Supervisorial

50%

83%

Chains: Non-supervisorial

75%

78%

Supplier Services

40%

50%*

Mom and Pop stores

36%

50%**

Public Market

17%

100%*

Tianguis

0%

--

Independent street vendors

36%

50%

ALL Retail Workers

40%

69%

* These estimates are based on one to two observations, so are particularly unreliable.
** This estimate only includes people who continued doing paid work, and does not include several
women who left the paid workforce.

Table 6 shows the percentage changing jobs within each sector, and the percentage of
changers who gained earnings via the change. Most job changes resulted in earnings increases,
especially for those starting out in chain stores and the public market. Importantly, chain store line
workers’ job changes were overwhelmingly tied to increased income, suggesting that their high
turnover is linked to upward mobility rather than short-run insecurity. However, they were less
likely to increase their incomes than chain store managers or public market workers who changed
jobs, and glancing back at Table 3 reminds us that despite little job movement, public market
workers enjoyed far larger increases in income than chain store workers or managers.
Transitions between formal and informal modes of retail were relatively rare. Among the less
formal retail formats, from mom and pops to independent street vendors, only two people, 6 percent
of the total, moved into formal jobs – and both outside retail. In the reverse direction, a slightly
higher 10 percent of chain and supplier service employees (three people) relocated to less formal
jobs. These frequencies are considerably lower than those estimated by Gong et al. (2004). Thus
workers’ relatively advantageous or disadvantageous positions tend to persist over time; in
particular, dreams of successful entrepreneurship are rarely fulfilled.
Though movements between formal and informal jobs were unusual, workers pursued five
other main strategies in changing jobs. These include two primarily formal job strategies, climbing
the corporate ladder and job-hopping; two informal job strategies, starting a business and moving
from retail into wholesale; and a final option of exiting the Mexican labor market via migration. In
some cases workers combined more than one strategy. Whereas market position helped explain pay
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differences across retail categories, workers’ degree of success in pursuing a particular strategy within
a particular category was especially shaped by gender and class.
i)

Climbing the corporate ladder

Many workers, especially women, run into limits to moving up within a company. While we
found occasional examples of climbing the corporate ladder, most workers felt stuck. Diego, a floor
worker at a Gigante supercenter, confronted corporate stratification with a class overlay and found
meaningful upward mobility unattainable:
‘I’m all alone in my department… I’ve been here nearly two years and I haven’t gotten a raise.
For my level of responsibility it’s not worth it. When there is a possibility of moving up, they
might give you the job, but they won’t give you the corresponding salary.’
Similarly, Eleanora promoted Nestlé products for thirteen years without moving up. Though
she wished to be supervisor, she knew she would never be offered the job because it required a
university degree, one of our markers of class.
ii)

Job-hopping

Eleanora ended up job-hopping to another employer, along with more than one-fifth of the
sample. Job-hopping is the most common earnings improvement strategy, but has its limits. Maura,
working at a mom and pop, when asked about opportunities to find a better job, cited the barriers
posed by social capital, the other class marker. She responded, ‘Right now there are very few
[opportunities]. If you don’t know someone who works at the business, they won’t give you a job.
Jobs are given more on the basis of contacts than skills.’
iii)

Starting a business

As noted above, starting a business is the most common aspiration. Some retail workers
turned this aspiration into a reality during the two-year period. But for most, it did not prove a
quick road to riches. After years of employment with little advancement, Daniel started selling
popsicles for BonIce, but was once more disappointed. He was among fifty vendors who had left the
franchise in 2007. He began selling belts and bags, spreading his wares out on the sidewalk, earning
an average of 135 dollars weekly for sixty-hour weeks – the same hourly income as before. Though
he was struggling, he considered his new job an improvement over BonIce. ‘Compared to last year,
I’m doing better. Last year I just sold juice, I worked for a company. But now I have my own
business and that’s a good thing. I’ve come up.’
Increased competition, including from expanding retail chains, limits new startups’
possibilities. Maura, the mom-and-pop employee who was discouraged about the prospects for
finding a better job, was also pessimistic about her dream of starting a new family business: ‘If you
look around, there is a business every five steps. Today, it’s harder for a business to get off the
ground fast.’
iv)

Moving from retail into wholesale

Some of those struggling to make a living in family businesses, particularly entrepreneurial
young men, saw income potential in improving their market position by moving further back on the
supply chain. David, who had worked at a fruit stand in the tianguis markets since he was 11, did
successfully move into wholesale. He was 18 at the time of the first interview, and reported
complementing the family fruit business with his own pirated DVD and CD stand. In 2006, he had
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just quit selling CDs and DVDs after running the stand for seven years due to repeated police
confiscations of merchandise.
Despite closing the stand, David and his brother used their knowledge of the industry to open
a wholesale business, copying and distributing DVDs to other tianguistas. He estimated selling 20
boxes of CDs and 20 boxes of DVDs, with total sales of around $6000 per month, and profits of
around $275. Faced with increasing competition, his income – and with it his job satisfaction –
eroded over the years despite his best efforts: ‘You live from day to day; there’s always going to be
something that goes wrong.’
v)

Migration

Nearly 40 percent of all people interviewed had considered migrating to the U.S. at some
point. David, just mentioned above, pursued this avenue. He migrated to the United States in 2006,
but was deported after just a short time in the country. By 2008, he was trying to once more save
enough money to pay for the border crossing later that year. Others said that they might have
considered migration, but were concerned about the violence along the border, the threat of U.S.
border patrol and immigration officers, and exploitation on the job. One tianguis worker remarked,
‘An immigrant suffers to get across the border, and the truth is they look on us as strange insects.
We’re not valued in the U.S….’
vi)

Multiple strategies

Examples of combining multiple strategies illustrate that inflexible scheduling in formal retail
can impede mobility, and that mobility is gendered. Noë’s story illustrates the first. Noë, an area
lead worker at a Waldo’s convenience store, studied public accounting, but found the schedule
challenging. ‘I study. Monday I’m here nights and leave Tuesday morning to run to school. On
Tuesdays, I’m often on the afternoon shift, so from school I come back here and I haven’t slept in a
day.’ The scheduling issues blocked his ability to advance, but he continued to take steps towards
his goal to open an accounting firm by taking a related internship and adding a box-making job –
despite pressure from his family to quit school.
Many mobility accounts suggest mobility’s gendered nature. Esmeralda, who sold products for
the large snack company Sabritas in an Aurrera supercenter, saw her opportunities as limited both
by education and gender.
‘Any company, any vendor services company…if there is a man, they make him
supervisor…Here, a boy who came in out of nowhere, they gave him a position just because he
had gone to college. Because he’s a man and he has a certain educational level. I’ve seen it.
There was a woman who worked with us who also had studied… and it was obvious that she
was the one who should move up, but they did something, they hired a boy who had his B.A.
and they left her in the lower position. She quit.’
Trainings, similarly, didn’t promote mobility, in her view. ‘My first course was sales. The
other courses are about self-esteem, physical and moral development, and then they just repeat.
They do the same trainings, but with different names.’
In addition, it was only women who left jobs to care for children. Even when care duties were
compatible with a job, they could foreclose further education.
Meeting aspirations, or abandoning them?
To what extent did people make progress in achieving their aspirations over time? Table 7
shows that overall, there was only progress toward meeting one-quarter of total aspirations, and less
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than half of respondents made progress toward any aspiration. Here high-end informal workers
converge with their formal counterparts, diverging from the groups of informal workers who occupy
weaker market positions. Chain store and supplier service workers, mom-and-pop stores, and public
market vendors hit the mark 50-60 percent of the time. On the other hand, tianguis vendors and
independent street vendors languished; one in six or fewer progressed.
Some respondents fully met their aspirations, but such success was exceptional. One
particularly successful case, which amply illustrates class advantages, was Leonel, who started out
promoting credit cards based at large retailers. Like others in supplier services, he hoped to open his
own business. Unlike others, he was able to do so within the two-year study period. He doubled his
credit card promotion income between 2006 and 2007. His high salary, family capital, and
entrepreneurial attitude made him able to achieve most of his rather ambitious goals: between 2006
and 2008, he finished his university degree, switched to a more lucrative job in the same field, and
opened a hotel and a corner store in houses owned by his family.
But overall, very few people made any progress towards opening a business over two years –
only three of 34 people made progress. More typical than Leonel is the case of Claudia. Claudia, a
popsicle vendor, hoped to guarantee her family’s livelihood by combining several sources of income,
rather than just one. She strove to continue studying medicine while selling popsicles, and hoped to
open her own taco restaurant. During the research period, she continued studying, but, given the
ease of entry by competing vendors, failed to save money towards other future enterprises.
Table 7: Aspiration Achievement by Sub-sector
Mom
Indep.
Chains:
Chains: Non- Supplier and Public
Street
Chains Supervisorial Supervisorial Services Pops Market Tianguis Vendors

Total

% of people
with some
progress
toward any
aspiration

54%

50%

58%

60%

55%

50%

13%

18%

42%

% of total
aspirations
on which
there was
progress

33%

32%

33%

40%

35%

17%

6%

11%

25%

People who wished to invest in businesses they already owned – concentrated in the less
formal sectors – were more likely to make progress over two years. Almost half of the 41 percent of
the sample with this goal were successful.
Employees in larger businesses (chains and supplier services), two-thirds of whom hoped to
move up, were still more successful, as reflected in Table 6. More than half of them did move to a
better job during the course of this study. For example, Luís, who started out managing a small
Super D convenience store, moved up to assistant manager of a store that was twice as large in one
year, and then to managing the store a year later. But Carmina, who had already spent four years as
assistant manager at a Farmacia Guadalajara drugstore at the time we first interviewed her, still had
not landed a desired store manager job by two years later – perhaps due to gender-based
discrimination.
Indeed, even over a two-year period, many respondents deferred or even abandoned cherished
dreams. Micaela, an owner of a mom and pop during 2006 interviews, is representative. Micaela had
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gotten loans from family members to open a small grocery store. In 2006, she hoped to open a
second store and make her business a chain, but a few weeks before the interview in 2007, she
closed the store. Part of the reason was a shift in priorities: ‘because I had my baby and I don’t have
anyone I can leave him with, so I have to take care of him.’ Her husband’s stable, relatively wellpaying salary as a graphic designer in the textile industry also helped make her decision not to work
outside the home possible. But she also highlighted low sales. When Micaela started earning less
than 13 dollars per day, she shut down. In 2007, she wished to put her baby in a daycare, take
practical courses in computers, and make crafts to sell, but as of her last interview in 2008, she had
been unable to do any of these things.
Some retail workers were so discouraged that, in later years in the sample, they declined to
state any aspirations. Even goals of making major purchases or setting aside savings proved elusive.
Of the twenty percent of retail workers who hoped to build their homes, buy a car or buy furniture,
only a third of them made any headway. Those who did were chain retail workers assisted by loans
available as part of their benefit packages. More than half of all people were able to save something
during at least one of the three years that they were interviewed, but only 30 percent of the sample
was able to save all three years.
Despite all these setbacks, hope dies hard. Even in 2008 as the economy weakened, the vast
majority of respondents – 93 percent, even including most of the tianguistas expressing resignation –
continued to nurture one or more aspirations.

Conclusions
The findings in this study speak to many of the central debates on informal employment, but
again, in ways that point to complexity rather than simple dichotomies. We started the analysis with
three questions: the degree of convergence or divergence between and within formal and informal
retail jobs; the roles of market position, gender, and class in determining worker outcomes; and the
impact of neoliberal restructuring on these labor market outcomes.
Convergence and divergence
While there are some differences between formal and informal workers, in many ways they are
overshadowed by inequalities within each of these categories – and convergences across the formalinformal divide. Within our sample, which is qualitatively representative of variation in urban retail
employment in the Mexican state of Tlaxcala, the wide pay ranges, differing pay trajectories, and
disparate rates of goal attainment within each sector underline these divergences. The gaps between
managers and line workers in formal chains, as well as those between public market workers and
tianguis or independent vendors in less formal retail, are particularly striking differences. Rank-andfile workers in chains actually earn less on average than any of the informal retail categories,
converging with lower-paid informal retail workers.
Determinants of labor outcomes
Market position – and especially locational capital – is particularly useful in explaining
differences between subsectors. The public market, for instance, has multiple market position
advantages: a central location, a wide range of merchandise, and week-long opening hours. Public
market workers’ gains, as earnings in almost all other sectors slumped, are harder to explain, but
may be due to consumers switching from chain stores to a cheaper option during the recession.
When it comes to within-sector differences in individual incomes and trajectories, gender and
class assume greater prominence. Women report facing labor market discrimination and are more
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likely to exit the labor market altogether to undertake care work. Class, as proxied by access to
higher education and social capital, is important in shaping opportunities to move up.
Neoliberal restructuring’s impact
The spread of giant chains is one fruit of neoliberal restructuring. The corporate retailers have
created degraded entry-level jobs and taken a bite of the less formal retail market. At the same time,
the broader consequences of Mexico’s cocktail of neoliberal policies have generated a growing
population with no formal employment opportunities, many of whom have joined a survivalist flood
into informal retail. The resulting pincer movement on informal retail has in particular squeezed the
tianguis and street vendors, sectors with fewer barriers to entry. Disturbingly, the 55 percent of the
sample who hoped to start a business were for the most part expressing a hope to enter one of the
two more troubled sectors we studied: mom and pop stores and tianguis stands (public market slots
are scarce and expensive, and few aspired to become street vendors). Indeed, quite a few of our
respondents voiced a clear-eyed analysis of the destructive competition facing small retailers, but
simultaneously voiced a hope to open a business, or to add another tianguis stand or sell at another
day’s mobile marketplace. This pursuit of a questionable strategy speaks both to the value people
place on autonomy and flexibility in the workplace and to the lack of economic options facing many
in our sample.
In summary, neither homogenization nor polarization adequately characterizes the relation
between formal and informal retail work in this Mexican setting. Instead the pattern could perhaps
best be described as re-stratification, with wide disparities within both formal and informal work.
The reconfiguration of Mexican commerce and the broader reconfiguration of the country’s
economy have altered the opportunity structure. Workers continue to harbor aspirations and to
devise strategies for upward mobility – but on a terrain that, for most, is far from promising.

NOTES

1.

We have borrowed the title of this article from Katz and Darbishire 2002, who use the phrase
‘converging divergences’ in a different context.
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APPENDIX TABLE A: DESCRIPTIONS OF RETAIL CHAINS
Chain

Description

Aurrera

Autoservicio (hypermarket/supercenter) selling food, clothing, and a wide
range of other goods, owned by Walmart

California Vinos y Licores

Liquor stores

Comercial Rivera

Medium-sized supermarket

Extra

Convenience store

Farmacia Guadalajara

Drugstore, selling food as well as standard drugstore items

Gigante

Autoservicio (hypermarket/supercenter) selling food, clothing, and a wide
range of other goods

ISSSTE

State-owned and -operated medium-sized supermarket

Mini Com

Convenience store

Oxxo

Convenience store

Productos Populares

Medium-sized supermarket

Soriana

Autoservicio (hypermarket/supercenter) selling food, clothing, and a wide
range of other goods

Super 6

Convenience store

Super Che

Convenience store

Super D

Medium-sized supermarket

Waldo’s

Variety store, somewhat larger than a convenience store, selling food as
well as other items

APPENDIX TABLE B: INDICATORS OF LABOR MARKET DISTRESS IN THE STATE OF
TLAXCALA, MEXICO, 2006-2008
Second quarter of:
2006

2007

2008

3.6%

4.9%

5.5%

Underemployment rate

16.2

17.3

Informal sector employment rate

39.3

37.5

56.3

57.5

Unemployment rate

% of paid workers who lack access to social benefits
Source: INEGI (2012).
Note: Indicators other than unemployment rate not available for 2006.
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